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THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION: A CASE STUDYt
Ca9yj Simsont
On various occasions, the Supreme Court has expressed its commitment to a method of constitutional interpretation that sees as its ultimate goal the implementation of the intent of the framers.' In The
Sovereign Prerogative,Professor Eugene Rostow succinctly explained the
nature of this search for original intent. His explanation indicates both
the broad view of intent that sound constitutional interpretation necessarily requires and the importance of history to understanding this
intent:
In deciding a constitutional case, the Court must deal with the policy
of a constitutional provision. It must decide whether the act of the
legislature or of the executive called into question before it is authorized by the Constitution, which has higher authority as an act of the
people. The political content of the judge's work is therefore to interpret and enforce the broad intention of the Constitution. That task is
rarely easy, since few provisions of the Constitution are beyond ambiguity. And it often has a political character. Judges and others have
held differing views as to the purpose of particular articles of the Constitution. As Chief Justice Hughes once said, there is no reason to
expect more unanimity on difficult problems of law than in the higher
reaches of physics, philosophy, or theology. For our purposes, however, the point is clear: there is a political element in constitutional
interpretation, requiring a judge to be thoroughly steeped in the history and public life of the country. This is the reason why so many of
our finest Justices, like Marshall, Taney, and Hughes, came to the
Court from active political life. But this political element in constitutional interpretation does not turn, and certainly should not turn,
merely on personal or partisan or idiosyncratic views of politics, but
on the differences serious men might well have in seeking to understand and apply the spirit and language of a Constitution intended to
2
last for centuries.
t* This article is a slightly revised version of a paper that appeared under the same title
in Power and Polic in Quest of Law: Essays in Honor of Eugene Victor Rostow (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984) (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds.).
t
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, Yale University. I
thank Kevin Clermont and Rosalind Simson for various helpful comments.
1 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98-100 (1970); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-50 (1905); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-89 (1824).
2
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This article examines Nevada v. Hall,3 a Supreme Court decision of recent years that I believe illustrates particularly well the need for close
analysis of history under an approach to constitutional interpretation
4
based on original intent.

On May 13, 1968, two California residents, Patricia Hall and her
son John, were seriously injured when their car collided on a California
highway with one driven by a University of Nevada employee engaged
at the time in official business. The employee was killed in the collision.
Invoking California's nonresident motorist long-arm jurisdiction statute,
the Halls brought a negligence action in a California state court against
the employee's estate, the University of Nevada, and the State of Nevada. By statute, Nevada had waived its and its agencies' sovereign immunity in tort cases only insofar as allowing Nevada courts to find it
liable for a maximum of $25,000 per claimant. In accordance with this
statutory policy, the state and the university moved for the California
court to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The trial court
granted the motion, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, but the
California Supreme Court reversed. In its opinion, the California high
court maintained that California was not obliged to recognize another
state's sovereign immunity when, as in the instant case, the other state
acted outside its territorial boundaries. California law made the state of
California liable without limitation in suits of this kind, and the court
concluded that, under the circumstances, Nevada should enjoy no
greater immunity from suit than California would enjoy. The state and
the university unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari. After the trial court on remand rejected a motion
by the state to apply the recovery ceiling in the Nevada statute, the case
went to trial. The jury found negligence and awarded the Halls
$1,150,000 in damages. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, the California Supreme
Court declined to review the case, and the United States Supreme Court
5
granted certiorari and affirmed.
3 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
4 Some commentators have questioned the validity of an original-intent approach even
if it takes the fairly expansive view of original intent described above. See, e.g., Brest, The
Misconceived Qmest for the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975); Munzer & Nichol, Does the Constitution
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1977). It is beyond the scope of this
article to attempt to respond to their various criticisms. For broad support for the type of
nonrestrictive original-intent approach pursued in this article, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

5 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The above description of the case is based on
the Court's opinion in Hall and on Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d
1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972).
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The Court, with Justice Stevens writing for a six to three majority,
held that nothing express or implicit in the Constitution required California to dismiss the suit against Nevada or to respect Nevada's $25,000
ceiling on recoveries against the state. After noting that the Court had
never ruled on the constitutional basis, if any, for states' immunity from
suit in other states' courts, 6 the majority opinion began its analysis by
distinguishing between two issues: a sovereign's immunity from suit in
its own courts, and the obligation of the courts of one sovereign to recognize another sovereign's claim of immunity. According to the majority,
a sovereign's absolute right to insist on immunity in its own courts has
been acknowledged since feudal times, but the immunity of one sovereign in another sovereign's courts traditionally has depended on the
existence of some agreement between the two sovereigns or on a voluntary decision by one sovereign to defer out of comity to the other sovereign's claim of immunity. 7 In the instant case, the Court reasoned,
California obviously had indicated its unwillingness to respect voluntarily Nevada's claim of immunity. There remained, however, the possibility urged by Nevada that, in ratifying the Constitution, California
had in effect already reached agreement with Nevada and every other
state in the union to respect claims of this sort.
Turning to this possibility, the Court first disclaimed the relevance
of the eleventh amendment, which in full provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State. 8
The majority briefly related the origins of the amendment. According
to this account,9 at the time of the framing of the Constitution, sovereign immunity was an important issue because many states had accumulated large Revolutionary War debts; during the ratification debates,
article III was said by some to subject a state against its will to federal
court suits by persons residing outside the state, but others denied that
the article was intended to have any such effect;' 0 and shortly after the
6 440 U.S. at 414. The Court also noted Nevada's claim that prior Court opinions
"reflected" the view that "no sovereign is amenable to suit without its consent." Id. The
Court made no attempt anywhere in its opinion to refute the claim. Justice Rehnquist's
review in his dissent of opinions manifesting this view leaves little doubt that, regardless of
whether or not the Court should have been significantly influenced by the validity of this
claim, the claim in fact was well-founded. Id. at 437-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 Id at 414-16.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
9 440 U.S. at 418-20.
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State
and Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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Court in 1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia" interpreted article III in accordance with the former of these two views, the eleventh amendment was
adopted in response. In the Hall Court's view, this history of an amendment aimed expressly at the federal courts had no bearing on the issue
at hand. Very simply, the topic under discussion in the late eighteenth
century was "federal-court jurisdiction and the extent to which the
States, by ratifying the Constitution and creating federal courts, had
authorized suits against themselves in those courts."' 2 The majority
opinion acknowledged that the framers "presumably" anticipated that
"prevailing notions of comity would provide adequate protection
against the unlikely prospect of an attempt by the courts of one State to
assert jurisdiction over another."' 3 It maintained, however, that this expectation was irrelevant to the proper resolution of the issue in Hall.
The critical point, according to the Court, was that "the need for constitutional protection against that contingency [of a state's being sued in
other states' courts against its will] was not discussed."' 14 There was
nothing, said the Court in summation, explicit or implicit in the eleventh amendment to support Nevada's claim for immunity. 15
Next, the Court denied that the requirement in article IV that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts
. . . of every other State" 16 in any way obligated California to apply
Nevada's sovereign immunity statute. California need not, the Court
held, dismiss the suit out of deference to the statute's limitation of any
waiver of immunity to Nevada courts, nor need it observe the statute's
$25,000 limitation on recoveries. The majority conceded that "in certain limited situations, the courts of one State must apply the statutory
law of another State."' 1 7 Emphasizing, however, that "the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law
in violation of its own legitimate public policy,"' 8 the majority found
that the case under review did not present such a situation. With regard
to persons injured on California roads, California had, the Court maintained, a substantial "interest" in applying the policy, expressed in its
laws, of full recovery for victims of others' negligence; and to require
California to sacrifice this interest in any way would be "obnoxious" to
California public policy. 19
Lastly, the majority opinion rejected Nevada's contention that, in
11
12
13
14

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
440 U.S. at 420-21.
Id at 419.
Id.

15
16
17
18

Id at 421.

19

Id at 424.

U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
440 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 422.
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providing for a union of various states, the Constitution implicitly requires each state to respect the others' sovereignty. The Court acknowledged that a number of provisions in the Constitution oblige states to
act with greater deference to one another than sovereign nations necessarily display in their interactions. The Court denied, however, that
these expressed limitations on one state's freedom to treat another state
as it wishes imply the existence of the particular unexpressed limitation
alleged to exist by Nevada. According to the majority, "if a federal
court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our Constitution
and nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its
policy of full compensation, that holding would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the States .... ,,20
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented. In an opinion joined by the other two dissenters, Justice Blackmun conceded that no specific constitutional provision establishes one
state's immunity from suit in another state's courts. He argued, however, that this immunity should be found to have "implicit constitutional dimension" because it was widely assumed at the time of the
framing that a state would not be forced to defend suits in other states'
courts.2 1 "The only reason why this immunity did not receive specific
mention," asserted Justice Blackmun, "is that it was too obvious to de'22
serve mention.
Writing for himself and the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the position on sovereign immunity taken in the majority
opinion was inconsistent with the "constitutional plan"-i.e., with the
"implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system necessary to
make the Constitution a workable governing charter and to give each
provision within that document the full effect intended by the Framers." 23 To support this conclusion, Justice Rehnquist essentially argued
along the following lines:24 a prominent ingredient of the constitutional
plan is the availability of federal courts to decide suits that state courts
are apt to decide in a provincial way; suits by individuals against unconsenting states ayre suits that state courts are apt to decide in a provincial
way; if state courts are free to entertain such suits, the constitutional
plan requires that federal courts be available to hear them as well; the
eleventh amendment, however, bars these suits from federal court; it is
therefore inconsistent with the constitutional plan for state courts to be
25
free to hear them.
20

Id

21

Id at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

at 426-27.

Id
23 Id at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)..
24 Id at 434-37.
25 Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist attached significance in his opinion to the
framers' apparent assumption that a state would not be sued in other states' courts without its
22

258
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II
If state court suits by individuals against unconsenting states are
constitutionally permissible, the Court in Hall failed to offer a persuasive
explanation why. More specifically, the Court did not adequately explain why the eleventh amendment should not be construed to establish
implicitly a prohibition on such suits. 26 First of all, the Court exaggerated the extent to which the recorded debate of the late eighteenth century about suits against states and the language of the eleventh
amendment militate against interpreting the amendment to cover state
courts. The Court tacitly assumed that the discussion of federal courts
and inattention to state courts in the recorded debate, and the mention
of federal courts and silence as to state courts in the amendment, imply
that the amendment was predicated on an understanding that state
courts would be free to entertain the suits that federal courts were expressly prohibited by the amendment from hearing. It is at least as
plausible, however, that the recorded debate and the words of the
amendment instead evidence an understanding of a very different sort:
that an express constitutional prohibition would not be needed to prevent state courts from hearing suits by individuals against unconsenting
states. As the Court acknowledged but summarily dismissed as irrelevant,2 7 in the years preceding adoption of the amendment, federal
courts were the only courts entertaining, or threatening in the foreseeable future to entertain, suits by individuals against unconsenting states.
Thus, the Court's literalism in Hall notwithstanding, the focus exclusively on federal courts in the recorded debate and in the words of the
amendment hardly forecloses the possibility that the eleventh amendconsent, id. at 435-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and like Justice Rehnquist, Justice Blackmun attached significance in his opinion to the seeming incongruity of the result in Hall in
light of the eleventh amendment and the role of federal courts, id. at 431 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Each of the two Justices, however, plainly placed primary reliance on the argument associated with him in the text above. Furthermore, in addition to making the arguments summarized in the text as to the constitutional source of the immunity claimed by
Nevada, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist attacked perceived ambiguities in the Court's
opinion, questioned the decision's consistency with precedent, and predicted adverse effects
from the decision on interstate relations.
26 The eleventh amendment does not expressly prohibit federal court suits against an
unconsenting state by all "individuals," but only ones by nonresidents of the state. It seems
appropriate, however, to discuss the amendment as a bar on suits by "individuals" and to
understand its possible implications for state court suits in those terms. Basically, the amendment's failure to mention residents alongside nonresidents is hardly indicative of an intent to
distinguish between residents and nonresidents with regard to their rights under the Constitution to sue an unconsenting state. Instead, in all probability, it simply reflects the fact that
residence within the state that one wishes to sue, unlike residence outside the defendant state,
is not arguably a basis for federal jurisdiction under article III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1. Cf Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the eleventh amendment bars
federal question suits in federal court against an unconsenting state by residents and nonresidents alike).
27 See 440 U.S. at 419; supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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ment was intended to prevent state courts from hearing suits against
unconsenting states if and when state courts should threaten to do so"intended" being understood broadly to include not only what the
framers of the amendment actually intended with regard to matters
within their contemplation, but also what they probably would have
intended with regard to matters outside their contemplation.2 8
Second, the Court did not indicate why, if the framers of the
amendment recognized (or would have recognized) that an express constitutional prohibition might be needed to keep state courts from hearing suits against unconsenting states, they rationally might have decided
to bar only federal courts from hearing these suits. Yet, if no rational
basis can be suggested for drawing this distinction between state and
federal courts, it must be assumed that the framers did not "intend" to
draw it.29
The majority was not alone in failing to argue convincingly for the
constitutional ruling that it deemed correct. Justice Blackmun's theory
in support of the disputed state court immunity is flawed because it
overestimates the significance of any consensus that may have existed at
the time of the framing with regard to state court suits against unconsenting states. A general expectation that a state would not be forced to
defend itself in other states' courts need not have been predicated on the
view that a state had any constitutional right to resist such a suit. Instead, such an expectation easily may have reflected only a recognition
that the states in particular and friendly sovereigns in general traditionally respected one another's claims of immunity. In and of itself, the
fact that the framers may have anticipated that a state would not be an
unwilling defendant in another state's courts hardly implies that they
intended to ensure that this event never come about.
Although Justice Rehnquist's appeal to the "constitutional plan"
highlights a factor-the protection against parochialism afforded by federal courts-important to the proper resolution of the constitutional
28 In this regard, it is instructive to compare the Court's approach in Hallwith its willingness on several occasions to find that the eleventh amendment prohibits a class of federal
court suits against an unconsenting state not expressly barred by the amendment. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (suits by foreign nations); Exparte New York, 256 U.S.
490 (1921) (admiralty suits); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (suits by citizens of the
defendant state).
29 The Court's full-faith-and-credit analysis in Hall, which basically conforms to the
Court's full-faith-and-credit approach of recent years, is hardly noncontroversial. It invites
the various criticisms that have been directed at the Court's modern approach. See, e.g.,
Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and FederalLaw, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 1315 (1981); Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law: A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 61 (1978); Twerski, On Territorialityand Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice
ofLaw, 10 HOFSTRA L. RaV. 149 (1981). I doubt, however, that under any of the alternatives
proposed to the Court's approach, a court violates full faith and credit by refusing, as the
California courts ultimately did in Hall, to dismiss a suit brought by a forum resident to
recover damages for injuries received in the forum state and compensable under forum law.
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question in Hall,30 it does not provide a firm foundation for Nevada's
claim of immunity. If the framers of the Constitution were absolutely
committed to having federal courts available to hear cases that state
courts would be apt to decide in a provincial way, then Justice Rehnquist's claim that the eleventh amendment's prohibition on federal
courts must imply the existence of a similar prohibition on state courts
would be difficult to dispute. By all indications, however, this commitment fell materially short of absolute. Perhaps most obviously, a conception of this commitment on the part of the framers as never yielding
to other values is belied by the original division of authority between
state and federal courts with regard to suits between citizens of different
states. Article III allows for the possibility that, despite the obvious invitation to parochial decisionmaking presented by these "diversity suits,"
such suits might only be tried in state courts: the Supreme Court would
lack original jurisdiction over these suits; inferior federal courts would
not exist unless Congress chose to create them; and even if Congress
chose to create such courts, it would not have to vest them with jurisdiction over diversity cases. 31 The fact that the first Congress exercised its
prerogatives to create lower federal courts and to vest them with diversityjurisdiction 32 is beside the point. For even if the framers anticipated
that Congress would act in this way, their decision not to mandate the
existence of lower federal courts with diversity jurisdiction evidences a
less than absolute commitment to having federal courts available for
cases that invite parochial decisionmaking.
III
The immediate purpose of the eleventh amendment was to eliminate federal-state friction stemming from federal courts' requiring states
to defend suits by individuals. In this section, I suggest that the purpose
of the eleventh amendment is most reasonably construed to include the
30
31

See infra text following notes 35 & 53.
See U.S. CONST. art. III:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish ....
Section 2. Thejudicial Power shall extend. . . to Controversies. . . between
Citizens of different States ....
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
(On Congress's inability to expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction beyond the several types of cases named as falling within it, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).)
32 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (1982)).
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elimination of another form of friction inimical to the smooth and efficient operation of the federal system: the interstate friction stemming
from state courts' entertaining this type of suit. To underline the importance to my thesis of close examination of the history of the eleventh
amendment, I first analyze the possible relevance of the eleventh
amendment to the issue in Hall without reference to the history of the
amendment. Then, after detailing various aspects of this history, I supplement my earlier analysis of the issue with inferences drawn from the
available historical data. At the outset, I emphasize that the analysis in
this section is tailored to the type of suit against a state under review in
Hall: a state court suit against an unconsenting state by an individual to
vindicate a state law claim. The immunity problems presented by other
types of suits against states-for example, ones brought by another state
or by a foreign nation, or ones by individuals based on federal law
claims-raise different sets of considerations and require resolution sen33
sitive to the particular considerations at hand.
A
Federal court suits by individuals against unconsenting states and
state court suits of this kind are similar insofar as they both threaten to
cause undesirable friction within the federal system-federal-state friction in the federal court setting and interstate friction in the state court
setting. For the federal venture to succeed, the central government and
the various states must work together harmoniously-in a spirit of cooperation and common endeavor. And for them to work together harmoniously, it is important that federal-state and interstate friction be kept
to a minimum.
Based only on this similarity between federal court and state court
33 The Supreme Court has found that suits against unconsenting states by other states
are within the scope of the federal judicial power. See New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 284 (1831). In Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Court concluded that the
eleventh amendment implicitly prohibits a federal court from entertaining a suit by a foreign
nation against a state unless the state consents to suit. For a sense of the various distinctions
drawn by the Court as to eleventh amendment limitations on suits by individuals against
states to vindicate federal law claims (including suits with state officers as the nominal defendants), compare Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (federal jurisdiction exists over suits
of this sort for prospective relief but not-except where Congress is competent to provide
otherwise and does-over such suits for retroactive relief). The view that the eleventh
amendment should be found not to bar any claim against a state arising under federal law is
argued in Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293, 337-47
(1980). For the view that a distinction should be drawn in this regard between federal causes
of action specifically authorized by Congress to be brought against states and federal causes of
action lacking such specific authorization, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 3-37 (1978); Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History ofthe Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413
(1975).
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suits by individuals against unconsenting states, it is unclear whether or
not the eleventh amendment's prohibition should be interpreted to extend to state courts. In light of then-existing and anticipated state court
practices, it is dubious that the framers of the eleventh amendment
thought carefully about states' immunity from suit in other states'
courts. If one hypothesizes, however, that they had done so, the above
similarity does not establish whether or not the framers would have intended that states enjoy in state court the constitutional immunity from
suit by individuals that the framers expressly guaranteed to states in
federal court. On the one hand, for either or both of two reasons, the
framers might have found that, although in the federal court context the
interest in avoiding friction within the federal system outweighs the
competing interest in ensuring that individuals with meritorious claims
against states are compensated for their losses, the relevant balance of
interests should come out against immunity in the state court context.
First, the framers at least arguably might have concluded that state
court suits by individuals against unconsenting states would generate
less serious friction than federal court suits of this sort. They rationally
might have based this conclusion on an assumption that states would
take particular umbrage at being stripped of their immunity by courts
of a sovereign that, shielded by federal supremacy, need not fear a response in kind.3 4 Alternatively, they rationally might have based this
conclusion on an assumption that, fearful in general of federal usurpation of authority traditionally exercised by the states, states would be
especially agitated by federal courts' making them defend suits against
their will. Second, the framers at least arguably might have found that
a factor without obvious counterpart in the federal court balance significantly militates against constitutionalizing immunity in the state court
context. More specifically, proceeding on the theory that states would
resent a federal rule that deprived them of a freedom-that of deciding
whether or not to hear suits against other sovereigns-that sovereigns
traditionally enjoy, the framers rationally might have found that a constitutional prohibition on state court suits by individuals against uncon35
senting states would generate substantial federal-state friction.
On the other hand, these reasons for striking the balance against
immunity in the state court context are not so persuasive that the framers sensibly might not have discounted them and found that, as in the
federal court context, the balance should be struck in favor of immunity.
Not only might the framers reasonably have concluded that state court
suits by individuals against unconsenting states would not create less
34 On the United States's implicit constitutional immunity from suit without its consent,
see Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1869).
35 Recall the Court's response to Nevada's claim of implicit constitutional protection.
See supra text accompanying note 20.
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serious friction than federal court suits of this sort; in light of the less
neutral nature of state tribunals, the framers quite sensibly might have
concluded that the state court suits would create more. Furthermore, it
is quite conceivable that the framers would have deemed inconsequential any federal-state friction apt to result from requiring states to defer
to one another's claims of immunity. Based on the fact that the states
already had agreed in many ways to treat one another as friendly sovereigns, 36 the framers reasonably might have decided that states would
not materially resent a federal rule that would prevent them from acting
toward one another in a manner that sovereign nations traditionally
have regarded as hostile.
B
To determine whether or not the eleventh amendment should be
construed as a prohibition on state court suits by individuals against
unconsenting states, it is necessary to turn to the history of the adoption
of the eleventh amendment. This history to which the opinions in Hall
devoted little attention begins with the Supreme Court's decision in
1793 in Chisholm v. Georgia.3 7 In Chisholm, Alexander Chisholm, executor
of the estate of a South Carolina merchant, sued Georgia in the
Supreme Court on behalf of the deceased merchant's estate. He sought
payment for war supplies that the merchant had delivered under contract to the state. Georgia refused to appear to defend the suit, and the
Court, after hearing argument by counsel for the plaintiff, granted by a
four to one margin the plaintiff's motion for a default judgment. In
individual opinions-the customary procedure for rendering decisions
at the time-the four Justices in the majority agreed that the Court enjoyed original jurisdiction over the suit by virtue of the clauses in article
III extending the federal judicial power to "Controversies. . .between
a State and Citizens of another State" 38 and granting the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over "Cases ' . . in which a State shall be

Party. ' 39 The dissenting Justice maintained that the Court clearly
lacked jurisdiction in the instant case because Congress had never authorized it to hear suits of this sort. He then voiced his doubts that,
under a fair reading of the Constitution, a state could ever be required
40
to defend a suit by an individual for the recovery of money.
Chisholm was met almost immediately with great hostility on the
part of Congress and the state governments. Within two days of the
36 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 (full faith and credit clause); art. IV, § 2, cl.1
(privileges and immunities clause).
37 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
38 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
39 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.2.
40 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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time that the decision was handed down, two resolutions had been introduced in Congress proposing a constitutional amendment that would
41
bar suits by individuals against unconsenting states in federal court.
Although Congress did not act on either resolution before adjourning
the next month, it overwhelmingly approved in early 1794 with no reported debate a subsequent resolution based almost verbatim on one of
these two. 42 By this time, prompted not simply by the possibility of
more suits like Chisholm's interfering with state finances 43 but also by
the actual existence on the Court's docket of other suits by individuals
against states, 44 almost every state governor had denounced Chisholm in
a message to his state's legislature, and various state legislatures had
passed resolutions and other measures indicating their displeasure with
the decision. 45 Particularly striking in this regard was the passage by a
sizable majority of the Georgia house of representatives of a bill prescribing "death, without the benefit of the clergy, by being hanged" for
a federal marshal or anyone else who attempted to levy on the state's
treasury or other state property to satisfy a claim against the state held
by Alexander Chisholm or any other person. 4 6 The amendment's history effectively came to a close within a year of the time that Congress
had acted. The legislatures of twelve of the existing fifteen states had
approved by then the proposed amendment, 47 thus satisfying the threefourths vote requirement set forth in article V for amending the Consti49
tution.4 8 Only the formalities of certification remained.
In 1890, the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana took the position
that the eleventh amendment simply vindicated an understanding
widely shared by the framers of article 111.50 According to the Court in
Hans, the Chisholm Court erred in reading article III to authorize federal
jurisdiction over suits against an unconsenting state by a person residing
outside the state. Under this view, the language in the article arguably
placing such suits within the federal judicial power was intended to auSee 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793); Pennsylvania Journal, Feb. 20, 1793.
See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30, 476-78 (1794).
43
See generallo Nowak, supra note 33, at 1433-4 1.
44
For the details of these cases, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 57-64 (1972). In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798),
the Court held that the eleventh amendment required the dismissal of any pending suits
instituted by individuals against unconsenting states prior to the adoption of the amendment.
45 See C. JACOBS, supra note 44, at 65-66.
46 Augusta Chronicle, Nov. 23, 1793. The Georgia senate did not go along, but perhaps
only because it believed that the less drastic means of a constitutional amendment would soon
be available to accomplish the same end. See C. JACOBS, supra note 44, at 57.
47 See C. JACOBS, supra note 44, at 67, 180 n.96.
43 U.S. CONST. art V.
49 Certification proved "extremely erratic," and the President did not notify Congress
until 1798 that the requisite number of states had ratified. C. JACOBS, supra note 44, at 67.
50
134 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1890). To similar effect, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 66062 & n.9 (1974); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
41
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thorize federal jurisdiction only over suits by states against out-of-staters
and over suits by out-of-staters against consenting states. In recent
years, some commentators have questioned the existence among the
framers of article III of broad agreement that the article did not subject
unconsenting states to suits by individuals. 51 They suggest that Chisholm
was not the clear violation of original intent that the Court in Hans supposed. For present purposes, I emphasize that, whether or not the framers of article III generally were agreed that article III did not extend
federal jurisdiction to suits by individuals against unconsenting states,
the fact remains that adamant and widespread support for protecting
states from such suits emerged unmistakably in the 1790s and soon
culminated in the adoption of the eleventh amendment.
C
The history presented above clarifies in two ways the relationship
between the balance actually struck by the framers of the eleventh
amendment for the federal court context and the balance that the framers of the amendment probably would have struck for the state court
context. In so doing, it indicates that the eleventh amendment should
be interpreted as barring suits by individuals against unconsenting
52
states in state and federal court alike.
One way in which the history of the eleventh amendment provides
this clarification is that it suggests that if the framers of the amendment
had thought carefully about states' immunity from suit in state court,
they probably would have concluded that state court suits by individuals against unconsenting states would create friction approximately as
serious as the friction created by federal court suits of this sort. This
proposition follows from two others. First, if the framers of the amendment had thought carefully about the source of the intense emotions to
51 See, e.g., C. JACOBS, supra note 44, at 3-51; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 527-36 (1978). The Court in
Hallcited Professor Jacobs on this point with apparent approval. See 440 U.S. at 419 & n.17.
52 Whether or not the balance struck by the framers of the eleventh amendment is one
that today would receive the approval of Congress and three-fourths of the states is open to
debate. On the one hand, states typically have repudiated at least in part their traditional
immunity from suit, see K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 25.00 to 25.00-2

(Supps. 1976 & 1980), and sovereign immunity has long been strongly and widely criticized,
see, e.g., Borchard, GovernmentalResponsibility in Tort (pts. 1-6), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924),
36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); Engdahl, Immunity and AccountabilityforPositive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1977). On the other hand, some states limit waivers of
immunity to the friendly confines of the state's own courts, see, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.031
(1977), and the state defendant in Hall is hardly the only state to find disagreeable the prospect of states' having to defend suits that they have not consented to defend, see, e.g., Brief of
41 States for Petition for Rehearing as Amici Curiae, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
Whether or not the Court believes that this balance struck in the late eighteenth century
currently would win approval, however, the Court lacks authority under an interpretive
model based on original intent to revise it.
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which Chisholm gave rise, they most reasonably would have concluded
that the friction caused by federal courts' hearing suits like the one in
Chisholm was based in whole or in large part on the threat of interference
with state finances posed by such suits, rather than on the federal nature
of the forum. For reasons mentioned earlier,53 it is conceivable that
some part of the antipathy to Chisholm might have derived from the fact
that the court in which Georgia was required to defend itself was a federal court: The states might have especially objected to federal courts'
stripping them of their immunity because federal courts could do so
without fear of retaliation against the federal sovereign and/or because
the states were anxious to prevent any further inroads into state autonomy by the new central government. It is highly dubious, however, that
these rather abstract and theoretical grounds for objection to Chisholm
fueled more than a small part of the outrage that followed in Chisholm's
wake. It is far more likely that strong emotions of this kind were directed entirely or largely at the very tangible threat to state finances
presented by existing and potential suits like the one in Chisholm. Second, if the framers indeed had concluded that the friction caused by
federal courts' hearing suits like the one in Chisholm was entirely or
largely unrelated to the federal nature of the forum, then they most reasonably would have proceeded to equate the friction stemming from
state court and federal court suits by individuals against unconsenting
states. At least arguably, the framers reasonably might have found that
the federal nature of the forum in federal court suits against states would
excite some small measure of special antipathy. It is doubtful, however,
that they reasonably might have assigned this finding any significance in
comparing state court and federal court suits against states, because they
almost certainly would have had to find that state court suits against
states excite by their appearance of partiality a measure of special antipathy no less substantial than the amount attributable in federal court
suits to the federal nature of the forum.
The second way in which the history of the eleventh amendment
sheds light on the issue in Hall is that it indicates that if the framers of
the amendment had thought carefully about states' immunity from suit
in state court, they probably would have concluded that the possible
federal-state friction caused by constitutionalizing states' immunity in
state courts would be insignificant. In view of the outrage with which
states reacted to Chisholm, the framers most reasonably would have assumed that the states would not be materially offended by a federal rule
that denied them the option to hear suits like the one in Chisholm and
54
offered them in return protection from such suits.

See supra text accompanying notes 34 & 35.
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments and federal civil rights legislation of the same era provide a possible basis for defending the result in Hall even if the
53
54
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In criticizing earlier in this article the Court's eleventh amendment
analysis, I argued that the absence of any mention of state courts in the
eleventh amendment does not strongly imply an intent to exclude state
courts from the amendment's coverage. 55 I based my argument on the
fact that at the time of the amendment federal courts were the only
tribunals either hearing suits against unconsenting states or apparently
likely to hear such suits. The history presented in this section lends further support to the view that the words of the eleventh amendment are
not a substantial impediment to interpreting the amendment to apply to
state and federal courts alike. It does so by revealing an amendment
process remarkably swift in all of its phases. Drafted essentially in two
days, proposed in short order by Congress, and ratified promptly by the
states, the eleventh amendment virtually begs for a mode of interpretation that studiously avoids undue attention to its precise words.

IV
Several years ago, Professor Martha Field set forth a novel theory of
the eleventh amendment that, if valid, would undermine entirely my
approach to the immunity issue in Hall.5 6 According to Professor Field,
the eleventh amendment was intended to repudiate Chisholm in a much
narrower way than the Court and commentators generally have supposed. She agrees that the amendment overturned the holding in
Chisholm that the Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits
by individuals against unconsenting states. She rejects, however, the received wisdom that in accomplishing this reversal of Chisholm, the
preceding eleventh amendment analysis is sound. These post-Civil War developments at least
arguably changed the nature of the federal system in a way that effected a tacit repeal of the
eleventh amendment in whole or in large part. Cf Thornton, supra note 33, at 334-47 (maintaining that the eleventh amendment "seems inconsistent" with the policies underlying the
post-Civil War amendments and the 1871 act, from which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) is derived,
and suggesting two respects in which the Court, in recognition of this inconsistency, should
narrow its current definition of the range of federal litigation barred by the eleventh amendment). If the eleventh amendment indeed has been significantly or fully repealed by these
developments, its implications for the issue in Hall are entitled to little, if any, respect.
An inquiry into the possible validity of a defense of Hallalong these lines is beyond the
scope of this article. Extensive discussion of the post-Civil War amendments and legislation
almost certainly would be involved. In keeping with this article's emphasis on history, however, it may be appropriate to mention some historical evidence that cautions against easy
acceptance of such a defense. Prior to 1860, various states had enacted laws waiving immunity from suit in their own courts. Having accumulated sizable debts during the Civil War,
many of these states sought to protect their economic interests by repealing these consents to
suit at the end of the war. See Engdahl, supra note 52, at 13, 21.
55 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
56 The basic theory is set forth in Field, supranote 51. In summarizing the theory in this
section, I rely occasionally for clarification on Professor Field's subsequent article, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit upon the States,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978).
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amendment constitutionalized states' immunity from suit by individuals
in federal court. In her view, the amendment simply established that
this immunity is a nonconstitutional issue-an issue for the federal
courts to decide as a matter of common law unless and until Congress in
the exercise of its rulemaking powers over the federal courts chooses to
decide it. Because recognition of sovereign immunity was the prevailing
common law doctrine at the time of the amendment, the immediate
effect of the amendment was, according to Professor Field, to give states
57
common law protection from suits by individuals in federal court.
If, as Professor Field maintains, the eleventh amendment was intended only to place on a nonconstitutional footing states' immunity
from suit by individuals in federal court, it is not even arguable that the
amendment constitutionalizes this immunity in state court, 58 and the
Court in Hall did well to pay the eleventh amendment so little heed. It
is dubious, however, that Professor Field's theory of the amendment is
sound. First, even if liberally construed, the words of the amendment
militate strongly against the theory. The amendment provides that the
federal judicial power "shall not be construed to extend to" specific
types of cases. According to Professor Field, "to extend to" should be
interpreted to mean "affirmatively to allow." 5 9 If "to extend to" is so
understood, the amendment says only that the federal judicial power
does not necessarily encompass the types of cases named. It leaves open
the possibility that the federal judicial power may encompass such suits.
This interpretation of "to extend to," however, may well be more than
the words can bear. Absent evidence to the contrary, it seems appropriate to assume that the framers of the amendment used "to extend to" in
its ordinary sense; and the ordinary meaning of "to extend to" is not
"affirmatively to allow," but instead "to reach"-a meaning incompatible with Professor Field's theory of the amendment. Furthermore, the
available evidence appears only to confirm that the framers of the
amendment used "to extend to" in its ordinary sense: in denoting the
types of cases included within the federal judicial power, the framers of
article III used "extend to" to mean "reach"; 60 and the framers of the
eleventh amendment plainly used as their point of departure in drafting
the amendment the language of article 111.61 Rather than assume, as
Professor Field does, that the framers of the eleventh amendment in57
58
546-49
59
60
61

See Field, supra note 51, at 538-46; Field, supra note 56, at 1261-62.
Professor Field makes clear this implication of her theory in Field, supra note 51, at'
& n.103.
See id at 543.
See generally C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 7, 8, 10 (4th ed. 1983).
For confirmation of the framers' reference to article III, compare the wording of the

eleventh amendment with that of the relevant portion of article III (reproduced supra at text

accompanying note 8 and in note 10, respectively). Also, recall that Chisholm was based on an
interpretation of article III and that the eleventh amendment was a direct response to

Chisholm.
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tended to use "extend to" differently from the way in which it had been
used in article III, it is far more reasonable to suppose that they borrowed these and other words from article III with the expectation and
desire that the words be interpreted to mean the same thing in both
contexts.
Second, Professor Field's theory of the eleventh amendment is unpersuasive because it clashes with the history of the amendment. If sovereign immunity enjoyed no more than common law status in federal
courts after the adoption of the eleventh amendment, the federal courts
or Congress at a very early date could have reinstated the Chisholm
Court's view of federal jurisdiction simply by declaring as a matter of
sound policy for the federal courts that suits like Chisholm's henceforth
would be heard. Yet, in view of the vehement negative reaction to
Chisholm that led rapidly to the adoption of the eleventh amendment, it
is virtually inconceivable that the amendment was intended to achieve a
reversal of Chisholm so readily undone. Professor Field acknowledges
that, under her interpretation of the amendment, early modification of
the restored immunity would have been theoretically possible. 62 She denies, however, that the existence of this possibility indicates that the
amendment probably was intended to give sovereign immunity constitutional status. In this regard, she asserts that the Congress that proposed the amendment was "not of a mind" to modify states' immunity
in federal court; 6 3 and she suggests that this Congress probably would
have considered substantial early judicial modification of this immunity
highly unlikely. 64 Even assuming, though, that these observations about
the proposing Congress are sound, it still must be seriously doubted that
the eleventh amendment theory urged by Professor Field can coexist
with the amendment's history. By all indications, the Congress that proposed the amendment and the states that ratified it felt so strongly
about protecting states from having to defend suits like the one in
Chisholm that they would not have been willing to take even the slightest
risk that in the foreseeable future a later Congress or the federal courts
would require states to defend such suits. Given their powerful sentiments on the matter, the most reasonable inference is that in adopting
the eleventh amendment, Congress and the states wished to ensure that
suits like the one in Chisholm would be barred from the federal courts in
perpetuity-that is, barred from the federal courts as a matter of consti65
tutional, rather than common, law.
62

See Field, supra note 51, at 545 n.98.

63

Se, id.

See id.; Field, supra note 56, at 1263.
The suit in Chirholm, like the one in Hall,was a suit to vindicate a state law claim. The
criticism in the above text of Professor Field's theory does not deny that the eleventh amendment sensibly may be interpreted to allow for some or all suits by individuals to vindicate
federal law claims against states. See supra note 33.
64
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V
In this article I have tried to demonstrate that the Court in Hall
gave history far less than its due. In doing so, my purpose has not been
to suggest that, in reaching its decisions, the Court generally should rely
on history to a greater extent than it does. Perhaps it should, but history
often may prove much less useful in resolving a constitutional issue than
it appears to prove with regard to the issue in Hall. My basic point is
that the Court cannot hope to decide correctly the significance, if any, of
history to the issue before it without studying the matter with considerable care. Overemphasis of history is no greater virtue than underemphasis. From a broad perspective, Hall should serve as a warning
against both.

